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Abstract. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was en-
forced in 2018. After this enforcement, many fines have already been
imposed by national data protection authorities in the European Union
(EU). This paper examines the individual GDPR articles referenced in
the enforcement decisions, as well as predicts the amount of enforcement
fines with available meta-data and text mining features extracted from
the enforcement decision documents. According to the results, articles
related to the general principles, lawfulness, and information security
have been the most frequently referenced ones. Although the amount of
fines imposed vary across the articles referenced, these three particular
articles do not stand out. Furthermore, good predictions are attainable
even with simple machine learning techniques for regression analysis. Ba-
sic meta-data (such as the articles referenced and the country of origin)
yields slightly better performance compared to the text mining features.
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1 Introduction
Data protection has a long history in the EU. In particular, the GDPR repealed
the earlier Directive 95/46/EC. Although this directive laid down much of the
legal groundwork for EU-wide data protection and privacy, its national adap-
tations, legal interpretations, and enforcement varied both across the member
states and different EU institutions [8]. In short: it was a paper tiger. In contrast,
Regulation (EU) 2016/679, the GDPR, is a regulation; it is binding throughout
the EU with only a minimal space for national adaptations. In practice, only
a few Articles (A) in the GDPR provide some but limited room for national
maneuvering; these include A6 with respect to relaxation in terms of other legal
obligations or public interests, A9 in terms of sensitive data, and A10 regarding
criminal matters. Thus, in general, this particular legislation should be inter-
preted and enforced uniformly through the European Union by national data
protection authorities whose formal powers are defined in A58. In practice, how-
ever, already the resources and thus the actual power for enforcement vary across
the member states [5]. Coupled with a lack of previous research on the enforce-
ment of the GDPR, this variance provides a motivation for the present work to
examine the recent enforcement fines imposed according to the conditions spec-
ified in A83. In addition, the work is motivated by a tangential question; is it
also possible to predict these enforcement fines by machine learning techniques?
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To answer to the question, the paper uses meta-data and text miming features
extracted from the decision documents released by the national authorities. As
such, only black-box predictions are sought; the goal is not to make any legal
interpretations whatsoever. Nevertheless, the answer provided still establishes
a solid contribution—especially when considering that the paper is presumably
the very first to even examine the GDPR enforcement fines. As is discussed in
Section 2, the black-box approach also places the paper into a specific branch
of existing research dealing with legal documents. This section also refines the
question into two more specific research questions. Afterwards, the structure is
straightforward: the dataset and methods are elaborated in Sections 3 and 4,
results are presented in Section 5, and conclusions follow in the final Section 6.
2 Background
Legal mining—in lack of a better term—has emerged in recent years as a promis-
ing but at times highly contested interdisciplinary field that uses machine learn-
ing techniques to analyze various aspects related to law [6]. Although the con-
crete application domains vary, case law and court cases are the prime exam-
ples already because these constitute the traditional kernel of legal scholarship.
Within this kernel, existing machine learning applications range from the clas-
sification of judges’ ideological positions [10] to prediction of decisions reached
by the European Court of Human Rights [13, 14]. These examples convey the
traditional functions of applied machine learning; exploratory data mining and
the prediction of the future. There is also another closely related application
domain. Again in lack of a better term, data extraction could be a label for
this domain: by exploiting the nature of law as an art of persuasion [6], the
domain uses distinct information retrieval techniques to extract and quantify
textual data from legal documents into structured collections with predefined
logic and semantics [1, 20]. For instance, a legal document might be seen to con-
tain some facts, rights, obligations, and prohibitions, statements and modalities
about these, and so forth. Although the two application domains are comple-
mentary in many respects, the underlying rationales exhibit some differences.
Oftentimes, the legal mining domain is motivated by a traditional rationale
for empirical social science research: to better understand trends and patterns
in lawmaking and law enforcement; to contrast these with legal philosophies and
theories; and so forth. This rationale extends to public administration: machine
learning may ease the systematic archiving of legal documents and the finding of
relevant documents, and, therefore, it may also reduce administrative costs [2].
While the data extraction domain can be motivated by the same arguments,
there is a further rationale for this domain: to extract requirements for soft-
ware systems in order to comply with the laws from which a given extraction
is done [20]. Driven by the genuine interest to facilitate collaboration between
lawyers and engineers in order to build law-compliant software and systems [22],
this rationale has been particularly prevalent in the contexts of data protection
and privacy. For instance, work has been done to extract requirements from the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act in the United States [1].
Against this backdrop, it is no real surprise that data extraction has been ap-
plied also for laws enacted in the EU. While there is previous work for identifying
requirements from the GDPR manually [11], there indeed exists also more sys-
tematic data extraction approaches [21]. However, neither domain has addressed
the enforcement of this EU-wide regulation. In fact, a reasonably comprehensive
literature search indicates no previous empirical research on the GDPR’s en-
forcement. Given this pronounced gap in the existing literature, this paper sets
to examine the following two Questions (Q) regarding the enforcement fines:
Q1: (i) Which GDPR articles have been most often referenced in the recent en-
forcement cases, (ii) and do the enforcement fines vary across these articles?
Q2: How well the recent GDPR fines can be predicted in terms of basic available
(i) meta-data and (ii) textual traits derived from the enforcement decisions?
These two questions place the present work into the legal mining domain. Also
the underlying rationales are transferable. For instance, an answer to Q1 helps
to understand which aspects of the GDPR have been actively enforced during
the early roll out of the regulation. Also Q2 carries a practical motivation: by
knowing whether the penalties are predictable by machine learning techniques,
a starting point is available for providing further insights in different practical
scenarios. These scenarios range from the automated archival of enforcement
decisions and the designation of preventive measures to litigation preparations.
However, it is important to remark that the GDPR’s enforcement is done by na-
tional data protection authorities. Although the focus on public administration
is maintained nevertheless, documents about the enforcement decisions reached
by these authorities should not be strictly equated to law-like legal documents.
This point provides an impetus to move forward by elaborating the dataset used.
3 Data
The dataset is based on a GDPR enforcement tracker that archives the fines
and penalties imposed by the European data protection authorities [3]. This
tracker is maintained by an international law firm for archiving most of the
known enforcement cases. Each case is accompanied by meta-data supplied by
the firm as well as a link to the corresponding decision from a national authority.
In addition to potentially missing cases due to the lack of publicly available
information, the archival material is unfortunately incomplete in many respects.
The reason originates from the incoherent reporting practices of the European
data protection authorities. Therefore, all cases were obtained from the tracker,
but the following four steps were followed to construct a sample for the analysis:
1. To maintain coherence between Q1 and Q2, only those cases were included
that had both meta-data and links to the decisions available. In terms of the
former, some cases lacked meta-data about the fines imposed, the particular
GDPR articles referenced in the decisions, and even links to the decisions.
2. To increase the quality of the sample, only those cases were included that
were accompanied with more or less formal documents supplied on the official
websites of the data protection authorities. Thus, those cases are excluded
whose archival material is based online media articles, excerpts collected from
annual reports released by the authorities, and related informal sources.
3. If two or more cases were referenced with the same decision, only one decision
document was included but the associated meta-data was unified into a single
case by merging the articles references and totaling the fines imposed.
4. All national decisions written in languages other than English were trans-
lated to English with Google Translate. In general, such machine translation
is necessary due to the EU-wide focus of the forthcoming empirical analysis.
Given these restrictions, the sample amounts to about 72% of all cases
archived to the tracker at the time of data collection. Even with these pre-
cautions, it should be stressed that the quality of the sample is hardly optimal.
While the accuracy of the meta-data supplied by the firm is taken for granted,
there are also some issues with the quality of the publicly available decisions.
The authorities in some countries (e.g., Hungary and Spain) have released highly
detailed and rigorous documents about their decisions, while some other author-
ities (e.g., in Germany) have opted for short press releases. Although most of
the documents were supplied in the portable document format (PDF) and infor-
mally signed by the authorities, it should be thus stressed that the data quality
is not consistent across the European countries observed. In addition, it is worth
remarking the detail that scanned PDF documents (as used, e.g., in Portugal)
had to be excluded due to the automatic data processing. While these data qual-
ity issues underline the paper’s exploratory approach, these carry also political
and administrative ramifications that are briefly discussed later on in Section 6.
4 Methods
Descriptive statistics and regression analysis are used for answering to the two
questions asked. In terms of Question Q1, dummy variables for the GDPR arti-
cles referenced are simply regressed against the logarithm of the fines imposed
by using the conventional analysis-of-variance (ANOVA). As many of the cases
reference multiple articles, it should be remarked that these dummy variables
are not so-called fixed effects. The methods for answering to the second Ques-
tion Q2 require a more thorough elaboration. In addition to (i) the GDPR arti-
cles, the meta-data aspects include dummy variables for the following features:
(ii) the year of a given enforcement case; (iii) the country in which the given
fine was imposed; and (iv) the sector of the violating organization. The last fea-
ture was constructed manually by using five categories: individuals, public sector
(including associations), telecommunications, private sector (excluding telecom-
munications), and unknown sector due to the lack of meta-data supplied in the
enforcement tracker. In total, these features amount to 49 dummy variables.
The textual aspects for Q2 are derived from the translated decisions. Seven
steps were used for pre-processing: (a) all translated decision documents were
lower-cased and (b) tokenized according to white space and punctuation char-
acters; (c) only alphabetical tokens recognized as English words were included;
(d) common and custom stopwords were excluded; (e) tokens with lengths less
than three characters or more than twenty characters were excluded; (f) all to-
kens were lemmatized into their common English dictionary forms; and, finally,
(g) those lemmatized tokens were excluded that occurred in the whole deci-
sion corpus in less than three times. A common natural language processing
library [18] was used for this processing together with a common English dictio-
nary [17]. In addition to the stopwords supplied in the library, the twelve most
frequent tokens were used as custom excluded stopwords: data, article, personal,
protection, processing, company, authority, regulation, information, case, art, and
page. After this pre-processing, the token-based term frequency (TF) and term
frequency inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) were calculated from the whole
corpus constructed (for the exact formulas used see, e.g., [19]). These common
information retrieval statistics are used for evaluating the other part in Q2. In
general, TF-IDF is often preferred as it penalizes frequently occurring terms.
Sparsity is the biggest issue for prediction. There are only 154 observations
but already the meta-data amounts to 49 independent variables—and the TF
and TF-IDF each to 4189 independent variables. Fortunately, the problem is not
uncommon, and well-known solutions exist for addressing it. Genomics is a good
example about the application domains riddled with the problem; within this
domain, it is not uncommon to operate with datasets containing a few thousand
observations and tens of thousands of predictors [4]. Dimension reduction is the
generic solution in this domain and other domains with similar problems. Thus,
three common dimension reduction methods for regression analysis are used:
principal component regression (PCR), partial least squares (PLS), and ridge
regression (for a concise overview of these methods see, e.g., [9]). In essence,
PCR uses uncorrelated linear combinations as the independent variables; PLS
is otherwise similar but also the dependent variable is used for constructing the
combinations. Ridge regression is based on a different principle: the dimensional-
ity is reduced by shrinking some of the regression coefficients to zero. In general,
all three methods are known to yield relatively similar results in applied work.
In terms of practical computation, the number of components for the PCR
and PLS models, and the shrinkage parameter for the ridge regression, is opti-
mized during the training while the results are reported with respect to a test set
containing 20% of the enforcement cases. Centering (but not scaling) is used prior
to the training with a 5-fold cross-validation. Computation is carried out with
the caret package [12] in conjunction with the pls [15] and foba [25] packages.
Although root-mean-square errors (RMSEs) are used for optimizing the train-
ing, the results are summarized with mean absolute errors (MAEs) due to their
straightforward interpretability. These are defined as the arithmetic means of
the absolute differences between the observed and predicted fines in the test set.
5 Results
The GDPR fines imposed vary greatly. As can be seen from Fig. 1, a range
from about e6 euros to e12 euros capture the majority of the enforcement fines
observed. This range amounts roughly from about four hundred to 163 thou-
sand euros. That said, the distribution has a fairly long tail; also a few large,
multi-million euro fines are present in the sample. Therefore, the sample cannot
be considered biased even though the restrictions discussed in Section 3 exclude
some of the largest enforcement cases, including the announcements about the
intention to fine the British Airways and Marriott International by the Informa-
tion Commissioner’s Office in the United Kingdom. Although these two excluded
cases are—at least at the time of writing—preliminary announcements, they are
still illuminating in the sense that both were about large-scale data breaches.
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Fig. 1: Enforcement Fines in the Sample
However, the GDPR’s corresponding A32 for information security has not
been the most frequently referenced article in the recent enforcement cases. In-
stead, A5 and A6, which address the general principles and lawfulness of personal
data processing, have clearly been the most referenced individual articles, as can
be seen from Fig. 2. These two articles account for as much as 87% of all 252 ref-
erences made in the 154 enforcement cases. More than six references have been
made to A13 (informing obligations to data subjects), A15 (right to access), A21
(right to object), and A17 (right to erasure). These references indicate that en-
forcement has been active also with respect to the rights granted by the GDPR
for individual data subjects. Furthermore, less frequent references have been
made in the decisions to numerous other articles. These include the obligations
to designate data protection officers (A37), conduct impact assessments (A35),
and consult supervisory authorities (A36), to name three examples. While the
principles, lawfulness, and information security account for the majority, the less
frequent but still visible references to more specific articles hint the regulation’s
whole scope is slowly being enforced by the national data protection authorities.
Turning to the second part of Q1, the regression coefficients from the log-
linear ANOVA model are visualized in Fig. 3 (the intercept is present in the
model but not shown in the figure, and A36 is omitted as the single reference
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In addition, A18, A28, A31, A35, A36, A37,
and A83 have each been referenced once.
In total, 252 references for the 154 cases.
Fig. 2: Referenced GDPR Articles in the Enforcement Cases
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Fig. 3: Enforcement Fines Across Articles (logarithm, ANOVA, 95% CIs)
made to the article corresponds with the single reference made to A35 in the same
decision; the dummy variable for A35 thus captures the effect of both articles).
As can be seen, the confidence intervals (CIs) are quite wide for the articles
referenced only infrequently, and only six coefficients are statistically significant
at the conventional threshold. Thus, some care is required for interpretation.
When looking at the coefficients with relatively tight CIs, it is evident that
variation is present but the magnitude of this variation is not substantial. Most of
the coefficients remain in the range [−5, 5]. However, together all the references
do yield a decent model; an F -test is statistically significant and the coefficient
of determination is large (R2 ' 0.44). To put aside the statistical insignificance,
it is also interesting to observe that some of the coefficients have negative signs,
meaning that some references indicate smaller fines compared to the average.
Among these are the conditions for consent (A7), sensitive data (A9), trans-
parency (A12), and informing (A13), as well as the already noted right to access
(A15), proper notifications about data breaches (A33), and the powers granted
for the supervisory authorities (A58). Finally, the magnitude of the coefficient
(1.52) for the information security article (A32) is significant but does not stand
out in terms of magnitude. When compared to cases without a reference to this
article, only about 1.5% higher fines have been imposed in cases referencing A32.
The results regarding Q2 are summarized in Fig. 4 (the MAEs for the training
refer to the best cross-validated models). Three noteworthy observations can
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Fig. 5: Observed and Predicted Values in the Test Set
be drawn from this summary. First and foremost, the prediction performance
is generally decent: the best-performing cases all yield MAEs roughly between
1.3 and 1.5 for the log-transformed fines. These average prediction errors seem
also reasonable when taking a closer look at the actual predictions—except for
the outlying large fines. Take Fig. 5 as a brief example; the figure displays the
observed fines and the predicted fines based on the PLS and ridge regression
estimators for the first meta-data model. Even though most of the predicted
observations are fairly close to the observed fines, the test set also contains one
five million euro fine that is quite severely underestimated by both regression
estimators. The underestimations amount to over 246 thousand euros. Though,
when a magnitude is measured in millions, it is a matter of interpretation whether
an error measured in hundreds of thousands is large, small, or something else.
Second, there are some interesting differences between the regression estima-
tors. In particular, PLS and ridge regression exhibit relatively large differences
between training and testing. The explanation relates to the RMSE-based opti-
mization during training. For instance, PCR was estimated with only one com-
ponent for the first meta-data model and three components for the remaining
three models, whereas two components were picked for all four PLS models.
Last but not least, the smallest MAE for the test set is outputted by ridge
regression using only the 49 meta-data variables. The second and third models
containing the TF and TF-IDF variables both perform worse. Furthermore, the
fourth model, which contains the meta-data and TF-IDF variables, indicates that
the text mining features tend to slightly weaken the predictions. It is also worth
remarking that some redundancy is present among the meta-data variables; com-
parable performance is obtained with only 17 meta-data variables that are left
after prior pre-processing with the caret ’s nearZeroVar function. All this said,
the overall interpretation should be less explicit when considering the practical
motivation for Q2 noted in Section 2. If only the decision documents are avail-
able without any prior work to manually construct the meta-data from these,
even the simple text mining features could be used for black-box predictions.
6 Conclusion
This paper explored two questions. The answers to these can be summarized as
follows. First: regarding Q1, the articles related to the general principles (A5),
lawfulness (A6), and information security (A32) have been most frequently ref-
erenced by the national data protection authorities during the early enforcement
period observed in this paper. Although also the enforcement fines vary across
the various GDPR articles referenced in the authorities’ decisions, the effects of
these three articles do not stand out in particular. A good corollary question
for further work would be to examine the future evolution of these references; a
hypothesis is that the regulation’s enforcement is slowly moving from the prin-
ciples and lawfulness conditions to more specific elements. Then: regarding Q2,
it is possible to obtain decent predictions even with standard machine learn-
ing techniques for regression analysis. Basic meta-data (i.e., articles referenced,
year of enforcement, country or origin, and industry sector) seems to provide
slightly better predictive performance compared to basic text mining features
(i.e., TF and TF-IDF) extracted from the decision documents. Yet, even the
text mining features seem sufficient for blind black-box predictions. There are
also many potential ways to improve the predictions reported, including those
related regression analysis (such as using specific sparse-PLS estimators) and
text mining (such as using word embeddings). Data mining techniques (such as
topic modeling) could be used also for better understanding the nuances behind
the decisions. An alternative path forward would be to extend the specific data
extraction approaches discussed in Section 2 to the enforcement decisions. How-
ever, the motivation to move forward is undermined by practical problems. As
was remarked in Section 3, already the quality of data is a problem of its own.
Recently, the enforcement of the GDPR has been fiercely criticized by some
public authorities and pundits alike. The reasons are many: a lack of trans-
parency and cooperation between national data protection authorities, diverg-
ing legal interpretations, cultural conflicts, the so-called “one-stop-shop” system,
old-fashioned information systems and poor data exchange practices, and so on
and so forth [23]. The data collection used for the present work testifies on behalf
of the criticism: the decision documents released by the national authorities have
varied wildly in terms of quality and rigor. Some national authorities have even
hidden their decisions from public scrutiny. A paradox is present: although A15
grants a right for data subjects to access their personal data, the same subjects
may need to exercise their separate freedom of information rights to obtain cues
about decisions reached by national authorities. Four legs good, two legs bad.
Finally, it is necessary to briefly point out the bigger issues affecting the le-
gal mining and data extraction domains—and, therefore, also the present work.
Like with the “code is law” notion, which has never existed in reality [16], there
are many philosophical counterarguments against the legal mining and data ex-
traction domains [6, 7]. It is problematic at best to codify the methodology of
a scholarly discipline into rigid schemas in order to nurse the methodological
requirements of another discipline; legal reasoning is distinct from other types
of reasoning exercised in empirical sciences; and so forth. Law is not code. But
code is increasingly used to predict law enforcement decisions. The legal mining
domain, in particular, is frequently involved with a motivation to build “a sys-
tem that could predict judicial decisions automatically” but with a provision
that there is “no intention of creating a system that could replace judges” [14].
Such system-building leads to another delicate paradox. Namely, the GDPR and
related laws (such as Directive 2016/680 for data protection in criminal matters)
were also designed to provide certain guards against legal mining and the result-
ing automated decision-making involving human beings [24]. This paper is not
immune to criticism originating from this fundamental paradox. If it is seen as
undesirable to build systems for making law enforcement decisions, it should be
also seen as undesirable to build systems for automatically fining companies.
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